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… the idea [of race], although repeatedly killed, is nevertheless undying.
Jacques Barzun (1965: ix)


After sponsoring death and despair over centuries and across continents, the scourge of race and racism was finally eradicated in the early twenty-first century. On a cold late January day in 2009, the ceremony symbolising its end was conducted before a massed crowd of eager witnesses to history numbering almost two million, accompanied by a national and worldwide audience of many millions more. It was perhaps fitting that this rite took place in the United States, the nation where, arguably, race had been most strongly entrenched and deterministic. And as the orator’s words that day noted that America’s ‘patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness’, not only was the enmity of race consigned to history but replaced with the audacious hope ‘that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself’.​[1]​

The 2008 general election success and inauguration of Barack Obama on 20 January 2009 as the 44th President of the United States signalled many things, often highly contestable. One of the most controversial aphorisms was, and indeed for some remains, a simple statement portrayed in the fantastical rendition above: that Obama’s ascent confirmed the United States as a post-racial society. If, as the contention goes, an African American could be elected to the highest office in the land and become the ‘leader of the free world’, then race was no longer a barrier to progress and achievement in America. Moreover, if America was post-racial and had become truly meritocratic then, by extension, it was also en route to becoming a post-racist society (Wise 2009).

But the suggestion of a post-racial shift has also been robustly contested. Obama is very much the exception that proves the long standing rule of racial stratification and racism, evidenced by a series of socioeconomic indicators including African Americans’ disproportionately high representation within the criminal justice and penal systems, higher rates of unemployment and lower average household incomes. Within this view not only is the post-racial society a fiction, but an extremely dangerous one that absolves profiteers of race and decrees they may keep their gains while threatening, once and for all, to end hopes of redistributive justice: the efficacy of postracialism is thus questionable because

a moderate ‘reformism’ that bevels off the jagged edges of racial dictatorship but leaves the underlying social structure of racial exclusion and injustice largely untouched is in a poor position to claim that it has ‘transcended’ race. In many if not all respects it has reinforced the very system it claims to have surpassed (Winant 2004: xix).  

Despite its ubiquity, the term ‘post-racial’ has been used in a rather superficial and impressionistic way within the news media to the extent that Cornel West argues that it is an ‘empty media category’ as well as ‘an empty illusion’ (2009: 240). Academic debates have tended to focus on this empty gesture towards an epochal shift and consider ‘postracial’ as an illusory political artifice (Winant 2004). As a result academic discussion of the postracial has tended towards the cursory. This tendency is regrettable because beneath the disingenuous real politik, vacuous utterance and straw man lie principles of great significance with a profound practical resonance that have a long and complex history. Towards this end, this chapter will unpack the term postracial alongside the racial eliminativist ideal in order to develop a wider postracial concept beyond the dishonest and vacuous utterance. Articulating the postracial with racial eliminativism, I locate an uneven history of anti-race thinking across the human, social and life sciences that often attempts to reject racial categories and concepts.​[2]​ I develop this postracial framework to demonstrate the different context-specific and objective-driven conditions of possibility for postracial thinking. This reformulation – or rescuing – of the postracial will illustrate how sets of material interests and practices are tethered to assemblages of ideas and values to form practico-theoretical ensembles of postracialism of which there are distinct formations.


What is the postracial?

Postracial is an extremely slippery term with various meanings within different contexts. As is the case with any ‘post’, postracial can be read on a spectrum ranging from signalling a decisive break to being indicative of an unfinished and uneven process. In terms of the latter, the complexity of a putative postracial process is compounded insofar as the diminution of race either ought to be demonstrable and/or is demonstrable: in other words, race is either disintegrating and/or ought to be actively dissembled. The dissimilarity between the postracial as a break or a process is crucial because it marks a key distinction between postracial as an objective situation or an idealization that is yet-to-be-realised. For example, in postracial terms the Obama Presidency might either signal the postracial era as real, a decisive break with the racial past or as an aspect of the destabilisation, but not eradication, of race.

The notion of the postracial as a process is developed within philosophical debates on racial eliminativism. Paul Taylor usefully defines a racial ‘eliminativist’ as ‘a racial skeptic for whom race-talk is at best an egregious error, and at worst a pernicious lie…. adherents of this perspective usually insist that we strike – that is, eliminate – race from our ontological vocabularies’ (2004: 87). So, the elimination of race here is not simply a process of atrophy, perhaps due to its internal contradictions, but is instead an active process that is the result of purposive determinations. The contention that race is an erroneous and ‘pernicious’ category renders it indefensible and it therefore ought to be eradicated demonstrates racial eliminativism as praxis.  Racial eliminativism, then, is a practico-theoretical ensemble that combines epistemological scrutiny, ethical critique, and political prescription.

There is an important point of note here: some, indeed most, forms of racial scepticism are not eliminativist. Within the body of thought that David Theo Goldberg and Philomena Essed (2002) term ‘race critical theory’, the validity of ‘race’ as an empirical object as well as its divisive consequences is subject to strenuous critique. Race critical theory, then, can inform and provide a point of entry into a process-based postracial perspective as reflected in Taylor’s observation of a productive synergy between racial scepticism and racial eliminativism. However, it must also be noted that some race critical theorists, while unconvinced of the efficacy of race and critical of its iniquitous applications, nevertheless retain the category and concept of race (sometimes in scare quotes) for various pragmatic purposes including ontological, methodological and political. So, while some racial scepticism may result in a postracial perspective there is no logical correspondence between the two and most race critical theory does not advocate racial eliminativism. The idea of postracialism as an idealised process is a particularly strong and extreme form of race critical theory, critical to the point that it asserts that no concession can be made towards race and the only option is its elimination. Postracialism, then, is most accurately applicable to the development of ideas and practices that might enable a process of racial elimination; it is an idealisation and an ambition.

The constitution of the postracial is significantly impacted by an internal contradiction. As is the case with any ‘post’, the relationship between the ‘post’ and its suffix is extremely complex and often agonistic. If one thinks of post-feminism, postcolonialism, and post-Marxism for example, it is arguable whether the suffix as the original formation is ever fully exceeded. The suffix stands as the post’s ‘Other’ and therefore always remains even if only in part as a disruptive trace that always has to be accounted for and/or needs to be dismissed. So, even if the post is meant to signify or aspire to a rupture, its Other is always there – even the act of denial maintains its existence, however fragile. And in these terms it is questionable whether the postracial ideal can fully escape the spectre of race. The postracial, like race, can also be characterised as comparative and relational; postracial can in part be identified as non-race or anti-race. Obviously, postracial is diametrically opposed to what is sometimes termed racial preservationism or conservationism – the notion that race ought to be retained, even if only for socially descriptive and analytical purposes. But race itself, albeit in the form of a profound dissatisfaction with it, is vital to formulating the postracial as a process – the postracial is conceptually dependent on race. 

As an ambition the postracial is characterised and haunted by a constituent dilemma. On one hand, as is the current orthodoxy across the life, social and human sciences, race is not real – it does not exist as an empirical object in nature. This epistemological assertion is central to the eliminativist’s rationale. But on the other hand, race is a powerful normative idea that is believed to be real, acted upon as real and, as such, it has practical effects and consequences. Therefore, to all intents and purposes race is real. This situation raises the stakes for eliminativism to an acute pitch: How can the reality of race be denied and rejected when it can have grave, even fatal consequences? Doesn’t eliminativism trivialise racially motivated homicide? Isn’t such a stance at best deeply insensitive towards and at worst a denial of suffering? Then again, aren’t attempts at eliminating race justified if the normalised idea of race helps reproduce the governmentality and social conditions that have unjust and mortal consequences? Ultimately, as Colette Guillaumin remarks, ‘Race does not exist. But it does kill people’ (1995: 107). This is a thorny problematic for racial conservationists and eliminativists alike that the postracial ideal is unable to escape. Therefore, in addition to being an ambition, the postracial is also a dilemma.


The actually-existing postracial society

Much current Anglo-American popular commentary suggests that the postracial society is an emergent or actually-existing form. Social indicators such as the increase of exogamous relationships and expansion, normalisation and acceptance of mixed race populations, improving ‘colour-blind’ interracial contact as well as occupational and residential integration, and increased black and minority ethnic social mobility and opportunity are cited as the empirical green shoots of racial transcendence and the colorblind ideal (Payne 1998; Mirza 2010; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1999). The election of Barack Obama is also held up as a bellwether and manipulated to represent the pinnacle of ‘post-racial liberalism’ (Wise 2010). In addition to the Anglo-American context, existent forms of postracialism are also proclaimed in Brasil, South Africa and France as ‘racial democracy’, ‘nonracialism’ and ‘racial differentialism’ respectively (Winant 2001).

The already-existing postracial society is periodised as a relatively recent phenomenon. Barnor Hesse (2011) identifies the ‘post racial horizon’ as a conceptual vista emerging in the mid-1990s with diverse individuals reconciling in an ecstasy of recognition, consumption and geniality as racism supposedly dissolves about them. Opting for a larger timeframe, Tim Wise recognises post-racial liberalism as a decades long project beginning with William Julius Wilson’s provocation, The Declining Significance of Race (1978). For Wise, Wilson’s thesis that class had become an increasingly significant factor in determining black Americans’ life chances and employment opportunities during the post-WWII industrial era because educational attainment and technical and professional skills were privileged within the economic sector has been central to the growth of post-racial liberalism. Indeed, Wise argues that the liberal project to promote ‘a de-emphasis of racial discrimination and race-based remedies for inequality, in favor of class-based or “universal” programs of uplift’ (2010: 16) is directly influenced by Wilson’s work. Moreover, Munira Mirza’s statement in reference to Britain that ‘race is no longer the significant disadvantage it is often portrayed to be’ because with regard to various indicators such as ‘educational attainment, career progression, rates of criminality, social mobility – class and socioeconomic background are more important’ (2010: 31-32) is also, in many ways, a restatement of Wilson’s thesis.

For advocates of a more strident vision of the actually-existing postracial society, Wilson’s intervention was wilfully circumscribed. Wilson’s claim that the urban black lumpenproletariat was effectively an underclass deemed superfluous to an advanced capitalist economy purely because of their lack of education, training and skills ought not only to have noted the declining significance of race but also the diminution of racism. In his controversial work, The End of Racism, Dinesh D’Souza argued that Wilson’s observation that cultural values emerge from and reflect social class position failed to call the so-called underclass to account for their moral and behavioural pathologies (1995: 483). Revisiting the ‘culture of poverty’ thesis previously advanced within the Moynihan Report, D’Souza accused Wilson of ‘excusing’ black pathologies as the product of poor life chances when instead they were the cause; Wilson and other apologists for black cultural pathology thus failed to account for the successes of black women and the black middle class as the sum of individual exceptions that disproved the disenfranchised underclass rule (1995: 519-20). In a supposedly ironic twist the postracist ideal portrayed here is undermined by the continued reification of race; although the putative underclass cannot claim to be victims of racism because their marginality results from their cultural not racial pathology, the socially and occupationally mobile black middle class as the direct beneficiaries of affirmative action are castigated as having a deep material interest in maintaining racial categories and quotas. Thus blacks are both guilty of addiction to racial patronage as a secondary pathology and infantilised through the unjust charity of positive discrimination that assumes their inability to succeed.

These disingenuous claims to the actually-existing postracial and postracist society are greatly exaggerated and the oft-cited figure of Wilson is useful in determining why. The post-racial liberal consensus that Wise critiques is a Machiavellian use of a colorblind ideal to deny the continued existence of racial discrimination and stratification that draws on Wilson’s work without necessarily being endorsed by him. This is evident in Wilson’s careful distinction between the declining significance of race in the economic sphere and its continued socio-political importance; for example, he recognised that the growing numbers of blacks in white-collar positions was not simply the result of progress and enlightened social attitudes but was assisted by ‘the pressures of state affirmative action programs’ (1978: 151). Conversely, given that ‘one of the legacies of the racial oppression in previous years is the continued disproportionate black representation in the underclass’ (1978: 154), the black underclass is not simply a residual economic class but something akin to a racialised historical lumpenproletariat. Crucially then, for Wilson, black workers and communities did not find themselves in a perilous position because they were black people but nevertheless they inhabited their precarious social position as black people; the significance of race might be declining in the present, but its historical, cumulative effects are still being felt. If Wilson has any affinity with the postracial, it is arguably in analytical terms; his intervention disputes the causal significance of race – where it is believed to exist, antagonistic race relations might be explained as a subjective manifestation of a material, class-based conflict. Nevertheless, while Wilson might be characterised as an eliminativist in economic terms, once faced with the postracial dilemma he accedes to the edifice of racial ideas that shape individual lives and the aggregated life chances of an underprivileged strata that may be racially aggravated.

The critique of the ‘actually-existing postracial society’ and ‘end of racism’ theses as vacuous and spurious is compelling. Instead of the inexorable march of liberal democratic social perfectibility yielding the actually-existing postracial society, the persistence of racism testifies to the opposite, to the postracial mirage. At best, reference to the existing postracial represent a diversionary sophistry: for example, Obama’s campaign team had counselled against the candidate giving a major speech on race, fearing that it might damage his ‘post-racial brand’ (Heilemann and Halperin 2010: 236) and although this seems coldly instrumental, it is perhaps a response to the threat of a white backlash as political pundits and commentators were prepared to view Obama as a postracial figure of hope for as long as he avoided racial issues (Odell Korgen and Brunsma 2011). And at worst, the ‘actually-existing postracial society’ and ‘end of racism’ are malignant tools that attempt to erase the reality of racial stratification, deny the effects of racist discrimination and, perhaps most importantly, seek to curtail the political and economic redistributive agenda that aims to ameliorate these ongoing injustices (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Winant 2001; Wise 2010).  Ultimately, there is no material basis for the assertion that a postracial era has been entered given persistent and continuing racial inequalities including within the criminal justice (Haney López 2010) and education systems (Howard and Flennaugh 2011).

There is also another deep irony evident here. The declaration that race has been transcended and racism defeated is reinforced by the support garnered from the racialised commentariat: the post-racist/racial verbiage of D’Souza, Mirza, and Tony Sewell, placed alongside ‘black conservatives’ such as Shelby Steele and the appropriation of Wilson as an advocate of post-racial liberalism, is presented as all the more compelling as spoken from mouths of colour. These commentators tend to utilise a liberal individualist framework that dismisses charges of racism as a form of victimology that conveniently blames ‘white people’ or ‘society’ instead of accepting individual and collective responsibility. However, the register of bitterness and loathing within this critique is particularly striking and difficult to explain: from D’Souza’s caustic condemnation of black pathology to Tony’s Sewell’s (2010) selection of black boys for strategic extra-curricular educational interventions who were effectively ‘shielded’ from their peers and quarantined from their communities’ ‘negative values’, the utter contempt and sheer disregard for fellow humans is palpable. But Steele’s (1999: 5) almost poignant rendition of the ‘greater exposure to contempt and shame’ incurred by the black conservative both from ‘their’ racial group and within their mixed professional circle shows the price of admission into existent postracial society. Ultimately, the very reliance on the racial tribunes to authenticate the color-blind/post-racial declaration negates claims to the dawn of an actually-existing postracial society and only brings the postracial mirage into sharp relief.


Proto postracialism

If the actually-existing postracial society can be dismissed as a fiction – albeit a particularly dangerous one – it is necessary to look elsewhere to trace the genealogy of authentic postracialism as an enduring dissention to normative racial ideas. As far back as the late 18th century, Herder (1968) disagreed with Kant’s racial typology, asserting instead that races could not reliably be said to exist. And in the following century Darwin (2004) stated that races could not exist as fixed, immutable types given the gradual and discontinuous evolutionary process. But despite their scepticism towards racial taxonomy neither Herder nor Darwin would move to reject the primordial basis and hereditary traits of race altogether – Herder (1997) still recognised the distinctive physical characteristics of ‘ordinary Negroes’, ‘Kalmucks’ and ‘Mongols’ amongst others and Darwin concluded that there is ‘no doubt that the various races, when carefully compared and measured, differ much from each other’ in physical and physiological ways amongst others (2004: 195). Nevertheless, taken together their partial reappraisal of race contributed towards the development of race critical theories that would gather momentum and depth during the 20th century as debates over the scientific validity of racial conceptualisation grew.

Stimulated in part by the rise of Nazism in Germany, the 1930s saw the publication of proto racial eliminativist works in the human and social sciences; Julian Huxley and A.C. Haddon’s We Europeans: A Survey of ‘Racial’ Problems published initially in 1935 and Jacques Barzun’s Race: A Study in Modern Superstition (1937) were followed by Ashley Montagu’s Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (1942). Each of these works stressed that the race concept was neither empirically secure nor methodologically reliable and its continued usage problematic. As a corrective We Europeans and Man’s Most Dangerous Myth both called for the discontinuation of racial terminology within scientific discourse and its replacement with ethnicity (Huxley and Haddon, 1935: 107-8; Montagu 1945: 73). Acutely aware of the durability of racial ideas and the immense difficulty of eradicating them altogether, Barzun stressed the need to purge all vestiges of race to the extent that he even recommended the reader to promptly forget his book once it had been read. Unlike Huxley, Haddon and Montagu, Barzun acknowledged the incipient dangers of nominating a substitute category such as ethnicity that might be used to perform some of the same theoretical and political work of the race concept as well as leaving open the possibility of returning to a discussion of the relative merits of race vis a vis alternative concepts proposed such as ethnicity and caste.​[3]​

It did not take long for the confirmation of Barzun’s fears, his forewarning that ‘one of the penalties of toying with the race-notion is that even a strong mind trying to repudiate it will find himself making assumptions and passing judgements on the basis of the theory he declaims’ (1938: 44) proved apposite. After WWII and the realisation of the horrors of the Final Solution and the Holocaust, UNESCO convened a panel of experts to debate the race question. The panel, mainly composed of social scientists and with Montagu as rapporteur, met in Paris in 1949 and published their report, Statement on Race, the following year. Statement on Race (1950) reiterated much of the earlier proto-eliminativist works in asserting human common descent and genetic similarity as well as rejecting the notion of any intrinsic inter-group intellectual and behavioural inequalities. However, by advocating replacing race with ethnicity ‘within common usage’, the Statement left open the possibility that race might be maintained outside of common usage which was swiftly exploited. The Statement also concluded that ‘races’ were effectively dynamic ‘breeding groups’ and that the associated scientific facts demonstrated that a clear distinction needed to be made between race as a ‘biological fact’ on one hand, and a ‘myth’ on the other (UNESCO 1950).

These qualifications and hesitancy in the 1950 Statement represented the fault line that Barzun feared and once the breach had been opened, conservative life scientists dissatisfied with the 1950 Statement as liberal and ideologically-driven seized their moment and effectively lobbied UNESCO to convene a second panel (Graves 2001; Reardon 2005). The second UNESCO panel composed purely of physical anthropologists and geneticists met and published their report in 1951 – with the revealing title, Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences – dismissing the social scientists’ views articulated within the 1950 Statement as unreliable and lacking the expertise of life scientists who were able to properly assess race as a biological entity unburdened by egalitarian dogma (Reardon 2005).  The assertion that ethnicity should replace race was removed from the 1951 Statement and some stunning additions made, including that race was a salient scientific and lay term:

The physical anthropologists and the man in the street both know that races exist: the former, from the scientifically recognisable and measurable congeries of traits which he uses in classifying the varieties of man; the latter from the immediate evidence of his senses when he sees an African, a European, an Asiatic and an American Indian together (UNESCO 1951: 349).

If the dependent clauses in the 1950 Statement were not enough of a compromise against a strong race critical – let alone eliminativist – declaration, the 1951 reactionary move away from the anti-racist tenor of the first Statement (Graves 2001) ensured that an important opportunity to seriously undermine race politically and scientifically in a significant historical moment was lost. This entire episode is instructive of a major problem facing racial eliminativism; the problem of properly moving beyond race. Hence, I refer to this period and these works – We Europeans, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth and the UNESCO Statements – as ‘proto’ postracialism. On one hand to be continually brought back into the orbit of race within the social world for protean and pragmatic reasons not least the misery and havoc wrought by racism is understandable. But on the other hand, the myopia and self-interest evident on both sides of the UNESCO strife – the proto eliminativists’ rejection of race but apparent inability to reconceptualise human phenotypical variation and the racial conservationists’ naked move to protect, amongst other things, their research careers, laboratories and grants – is all the more disappointing. Nonetheless, after the missteps of proto postracialism a major challenge for a racial eliminativist engagement with science, indeed the entire postracial endeavour, is clear: to fully surpass race by dismantling it but not becoming fixated on its negation to the detriment of developing an affirmative humanistic project. Therefore, postracial contributions to scientific debate are charged with escaping raciological norms and assumptions while helping fashion a new vocabulary and creating the appropriate concepts for pursuing an accurate understanding of human biodiversity.


Postracial biosciences

It would be wrong to overstate the academic inter-disciplinary warfare between life and social scientists that broke out in the corridors of UNESCO and the correspondence pages of Man. Biologists were not habitual racial conservationists and all social scientists were not race sceptics. But for the sceptics straddling the social and life sciences, the ‘new synthesis’ that emerged during the mid-1930s as a combination of Darwin’s evolutionary theory and Mendel’s thesis of the irregularity of genetic inheritance was particularly important to the development of the race critical theories that would underpin racial eliminativism. Under the new synthesis, the notion of blended inheritance central to classical racial explanation became untenable, and the existence of distinct racial types was declared forged instead of found (Livingstone 1962). 

After the inter-war years and the new synthesis, the aftermath of WWII and beyond is the moment where some attempts to understand human biodiversity formally and consistently eschew the race concept. An element of the systematic study of human biodiversity generated in this moment is suggestive of an enterprise that I want to refer to as postracial biosciences; a methodological approach that matured beyond the hesitancy and contradictions of proto postracialism to consistently deconstruct race. Numerous nominally postracial scientists over an extended period declared the biological race concept redundant: influenced by Julian Huxley’s (1938) concept of ‘cline’ as an expression of the frequency of genes within a given biological group across a gradient, the anthropologist Frank Livingstone stated that ‘There are no races, there are only clines’ (1962: 279); the geneticist Richard Lewontin (1972) discovered that human biodiversity is greatest within so-called racial groups, genetic similarity is evident across so-called ‘races’, and ‘the largest part by far of human variation being accounted for by the differences between individuals’; and J. Craig Venter, the President and Chief Scientific Officer of Celera Genomics, responded to the US Food and Drug Administration approval of BiDil, a drug for heart disease developed specifically for African Americans, by saying ‘It is disturbing to see reputable scientists and physicians even categorizing things in terms of race…. There is no basis in the genetic code for race’ (cited in Brody and Hunt 2006: 557). 

These indicative statements of falsification central within postracial biosciences are not solely a critique of race but also constituted part of the affirmative basis for racial eliminativism: Livingstone recognised that ‘there are excellent arguments for abandoning the concept of race with reference to the living populations of Homo sapiens’ (1962: 279), while Lewontin issued his own firm rejection:

Human racial classification is of no social value and is positively destructive of   social and human relations. Since such racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance either, no justification can be offered for its continuance (cited in Montagu 1997: 46).

This corrective is a robust rationale for a postracial bioscience. For the racial sceptic it is epistemologically and methodologically precise as well as ethically and politically compelling. And it is rigorous in neither resorting to offering the consolation of a replacement category nor vacillating in its recommendation.

Notably, the postracial bio-scientific intervention does not represent the death of race and triumph of postracialism. Lewontin’s formulation, popularised as humans are 85% similar and 15% dissimilar irregardless of ‘race’, has been critiqued as a ‘fallacy’ on the grounds that a population cannot be reasonably expected to be typified by genetic sameness because the frequency of particular genes are not measured at individual loci (Edwards 2003) – relatedly, it has been argued that even minute percentile genetic differences can be highly statistically significant (Sarich and Miele 2004) and that ‘the greatest differentiation in the human population occurs between continentally separated groups’ (Burchard et al, 2003: 1171). Race is also defended insofar as, methodologically speaking, assignment into genetic clusters consistent with racial groups on the basis of biological markers is probabilistic and need not be absolute. Consequently, race is also a meaningful category because it can be used to demonstrate a range of entrenched biological differences between populations, for example, ‘There is overwhelming evidence that human populations exhibit probabilistic differences in specific genetic patterns associated with brain functions and sexual hormones’ (Minkov, 2011: 40). Leaving the validity and value of racial typification aside, variation within Homo sapiens is nonetheless discernible and constantly verified by studies noting the existence of population ‘clusters’ (Risch et al 2002).

So, the broad set of critical and prescriptive insights gathered under the aegis of postracial biosciences did not represent a consensus and therefore should not be overstated. But even if Barzun’s wish was not realised and race had not been ‘killed’, it was nevertheless seriously wounded. The contributions of postracial bioscience normalised the demand that the continued use of race required thoroughgoing empirical justification and methodological defence and stimulated debate on its usefulness in pragmatic, strategic and social terms. Minkov (2011), for example, perhaps recognising that overwhelming evidence of a probability as opposed to proof of an absolute is not particularly compelling, concedes that population distributions may differ from racial distributions, thus invalidating race as a meaningful analytic concept. As a result, continued reference to race within health and biosciences by clinicians, epidemiologists and the like is often heavily qualified: amongst many things, race is, variously, ‘a rough proxy’ (Jones 2001); self-identified and thus contingent (Bonham, Warshauer-Baker and Collins, 2005); ‘a product of an arranged marriage between the social and biologic worlds’ (Cooper, Kaufman and Ward, 2003: 1169); ‘generally highly statistically significant’ (Nei and Roychoudhury 1982: 41); and a ‘probabilistic marker’ (see Kennedy 2001).

The routine attachment of such caveats to race can be regarded as demonstrating the significant postracial bio-scientific insights that genetic populations are changeable and subject to shifting migratory patterns that make them indefinable in absolute (read racial) terms. And the attempts to retain biological determinism, such as Minkov’s argument that a discernible pattern might nevertheless be ethnic thus justifying the analysis of bio-cultural correlations with an ethnic distribution that bisect racial lines, can be recognised as a desperate racial conservationism: changing the object from race to ethnicity, culture, population, target group and so on simply serves to maintain the possibility of somehow establishing a causal relationship or meaningful probabilistic correlation between genetic clusters and prevalent traits – race is known to be the answer, the ‘correct’ factors just need to be found. But instead of accepting the burden of proof for the existence of the race concept it believes to be real, this naive deductivism reveals its insecurity by trying to place a burden of disproof on racial eliminativism: in Popper’s terms, then, race is no longer a scientific object as it can be neither proven nor disproven, it is at best a cipher within health and the biosciences and at worst a paranormal entity that inspires faithful belief but can neither be empirically verified nor coherently known. As Michael Banton argues in this volume, there has been a long standing false distinction between an inaccurate folk and valid scientific concept of race. Banton shows that the conflation of outward appearance, phenotype, and what it was taken to represent as a role sign, race, is not an indisputable scientific truth claim but based on impressionistic speculation.


Cosmopolitan postracialism

Methodological inconsistency and conceptual disorder aside, the critique of race initiated in the inter-war years demonstrated a strong political sense and ethical sensibility. The objections raised by Haddon and Huxley, Barzun, and Montagu was not just that race was epistemologically problematic but that it gave rise to spurious racial ‘sentiments’ and was pressed into the service of pernicious political projects including Atlantic slavery and Nazism. And as the scientific community became increasingly diverse in gender and ethnic composition from the inter-war years onwards, data was generated and arguments mobilised to refute judgments of reputed group ‘inferiority’ on egalitarian principles as well as metaphysical grounds (Barkan 1992). Therefore, as well as being epistemologically and methodological problematic, race was also subject to social critique and deemed morally indefensible.

These incipient ontological and ethical concerns are taken up and developed within contemporary debates that illustrate the generalising principle at the centre of the race concept that refers to individuals only as the sum of a racial group. Kwame Anthony Appiah (1996) argues that normative racial typologies generate linked ‘collective scripts’ that determine the definitive mode of (racial) being. There is, then, an authentic racial personality and disposition that is maintained in part through the threat of being labelled as inauthentic – Richard T. Ford (2005) recognises this in the use of ‘apple’, ‘banana’ and ‘oreo’ as racial epithets for individuals who transgress against their given racial identity evident in their external appearance by being treacherously ‘white on the inside’. Similarly, many mixed-race individuals have been miscategorised as black as a result of the one-drop rule of hypodescent (Zack 1993) and white people are automatically inducted at birth into the privileged club of whiteness (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996). As a result, these scripts constrain individuals and are limiting for personal development. Individuals feel pressurised to conform to normative racial behaviours for fear of ridicule and disapprobation should they resist (Hill 2000), and mixed race people are ‘trapped’ in a past consumed with the dangers of miscegenation that does not allow them to create a future-oriented self (Zack 1993).

For many of these thinkers, the response to the tyranny of racial collective identities that ‘go imperial’ to the detriment of ontological complexity (Appiah 1996) is an eliminativist one: Zack (1993) argues for becoming ‘raceless’ whereby individuals are divested of race and invest in personal projects of becoming in relation to their own future desires; self-styled ‘race traitors’ and ‘New Abolitionists’ call for the abolition of whiteness by white peoples’ disinvestment in white privilege under the slogan ‘Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity’ (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996); and Jason Hill advocates the ‘moral rejection of all forms of racial, ethnic, and national tribalism’ (2000: 1). Instead, Hill calls for the development of a ‘moral cosmopolitanism’ centred around a radical ontological rebellion that abandons constraining collective racial identity in favour of a cosmopolitan individuals’ self-appointed status as ‘eternal emigrants… who resent fixed standpoints, unreflective constitutive identities, and markers of completion as proof of a good life’ (2000: 77). Therefore, stripped of the certainties of racial identity and its determining ‘scripts’, ready-made community, and in-built solidarity, the cosmopolitan individual escapes the limitations of ascribed being and is able to enter a personal project of existential becoming. For Zack, such ‘racelessness’ as a disavowal of racial identity ‘is more authentic than projections of the self onto “one hundred generations” that bear no relation to the self in the dimension to which one might turn for self-identification as a human being’ (1993: 164).

For critics of racial eliminativism the individual is figured rather differently. The everyday lived experience of racialised being means that race and racial identification is ‘phenomenally real’ and has an active embodied and affective dimension. Therefore, racial eliminativism might be regarded as unreflexive in trivialising and disregarding the intimate conditions of individual lives and its inability to account for the existential conditions within which ‘race’ becomes meaningful. Linda Martín Alcoff argues for a phenomenology of racial embodiment based on a ‘subjectivist contextualism’ that recognises macro-level social relations that structure racialisation while also attentive to the micro-level interactions illustrating ‘how race is constitutive of bodily experience, subjectivity, judgment, and epistemic relationships’ (2001: 271). Alcoff acknowledges concerns that this approach might be seen as reifying racial experience as an epiphenomenon with self-evident meaning, however she argues that the process of racialised perception is dynamic and has no intrinsic meaning. Therefore, instead of disregarding the existence of and reference to race as required by eliminativism, Alcoff wants to ‘make visible the practices of visibility’ in order to understand the context that knowledge of ourselves and others emerges from in order to attempt ‘to alter the associated meanings ascribed to visible difference’ (2001: 281).

The strong constructivist critique central to racial eliminativism reverses this formulation – visible difference is constituted by the ascription of meaning instead of existing prior to that process. Therefore, the individualistic dimension of a cosmopolitan eliminativist formation is reinforced by a humanist ethics and related political concerns to critique and counter phenomenological justifications of race. The very notion of altering the ‘associated meanings’ of visible (racial) difference is strenuously contested by eliminativism. For Appiah (1990) the invention of race has propagated spurious racial differences that diminish or deny human commonalty, encourage the pathological suspicion of Others, and thus denies the ‘moral unity of humanity’. Gilroy (2000) extensively argues that this promotion of racial exceptionalism is amplified by the phenomenological appeal to racial unanimity; the embodiment of racial subjectivity is suggestive of a collective identity, involuntary affinity and attendant solidarity that is found within an affective, subjective and experiential dimension and articulated through the grammar of visual imagery as opposed to being forged through discussion and negotiation. One of Gilroy’s key concerns is that this appeal to belonging found in the short-circuit signs of the body it is not a democratic form of politics and thus creates a false solidarity based on racial authenticity that is redolent of authoritarian and fascistic motifs and can easily become absolutist. Consequently, race cannot escape its historical taint, it cannot be reconstituted or rehabilitated and racial eliminativism is the only viable response: eradicating race is ‘the only ethical response to the conspicuous wrongs that raciologies continue to solicit and sanction’ (Gilroy 2000: 41).

Taken together, these ethical and political concerns form the basis of a dual justification for racial eliminativism: ethically, racial eliminativism is justified because ‘race’ creates harmful preferential distinctions between human beings; and politically, racial eliminativism is justified because ‘race’ encourages negative political projects not only in relation to subjugation but also ostensibly with regard to progressive politics – Gilroy (2000) suggests that even an anti-racist politics is a politics of negation, i.e. anti-racism, and asks what sorts of projects might a racial politics positively seek?  What progressive aims would it wish to establish? In this affirmative vein, Gilroy promotes ‘strategic universalism’ and ‘planetary humanism’, calling for a ‘postanthropological’, common humanity that is predicated on an authentic fraternity and democratic ideal. This appeal to the ‘cosmopolitan yet-to-come’ as an ongoing process of negotiating a progressive political programme and its related social objectives is post-foundationalist and eviscerates appeals to particularised and insular phenomenology be it the paradigmatic Human, racial or masculine figures of Enlightenment rationality and imperial domination.


Whither postracialism?

‘That race should be irrelevant’, writes Charles W. Mills, ‘is certainly an attractive ideal, but when it has not been irrelevant, it is absurd to proceed as if it had been’ (1998: 41, original emphasis). This rearticulation of the postracial dilemma serves as a damning indictment of racial eliminativism and the basis for manifold reservations about the postracial project, four of which I want to briefly outline. First, postracialism is considered utterly and irredeemably impractical. While it may represent a well-intentioned and laudable ideal it can never be realized because race is so deeply socially embedded (Parker and Song 2001). Even when intended as a practical and theoretical project the high level of abstraction that racial eliminativism is pitched at questions its material efficacy: Precisely how might race be eliminated? Is an edict to be issued from on high? Or alternately does racial eliminativism allude to the withering away of race – its declining significance? But given the organic, haphazard quality of withering away as a gradualist process it is not clear how this can be fostered. Withering away can be mapped retrospectively but not directed. And lastly, postracial advocates develop critiques of race but tend to offer little in the programmatic vein other than the vague exhortation and pedagogical proclamations as in the first UNESCO Statement – even the thoroughgoing observations of Jacques Barzun led him to unapologetically state that he had nothing to offer by way of a postracial strategy.

Second, it is not clear how, or if, postracialism would work methodologically. The ascribed racial identities that racial eliminativists wish to reject are not simply behavioural and existential ‘scripts’ but are produced through and by deep social structures. Therefore, race is ‘ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective’ which is to say that although it has no natural existence its use is socially-produced and subject to societal conventions making race a real object that is independent of individual perception and not party to unilateral alteration or rejection (Mills 1998; Taylor 2003). Micro methods of racial eliminativism such as ‘ontological rebellion’ (Hill 2000) and race traitors’ rejecting the privileges of whiteness through mundane individual acts are insubstantial, futile efforts in the face of enduring social structures.

Third, to all intents and purposes postracialism is apolitical – in the sense of a radical, progressive politics. The lack of a prescriptive programme as stated above signals the largely theoretical orientation of postracialism that gestures towards but effectively disengages material reality. The racial concepts rejected by postracialism as a basis for invidious public policies such as racial profiling in policing are simultaneously necessary for the longitudinal monitoring of discriminatory practices, such as profiling, in order to discern patterns and inform ameliorative strategies: so, there may be a disconnect between postracialism and antiracism. Moreover, postracialism’s orientation towards the ideal-typical transcendent and autonomous individual liberated from racial communalism has significant consequences: the eliminativist appeal to individuated forms of labour – for example intellectual and ethical – is divorced from the hard political work of movement-building. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that postracialism could become a Trojan horse for an atomised colour-blindness that espouses individual free choice (Bonilla-Silva 2003) and reactionary laisse-faire liberalism (Wise 2011).

Fourth, postracialism is deracinating and inattentive towards what Alcoff (2001) conceptualises as the lived embodiment of racial identity as a subjectivist contextualism. Races are irreducible to biology and naturalistic understandings, they can also be regarded as collective social identities forged through processes of racial formation; eliminating ‘race’ would attempt to erase significant histories of hard-fought political struggles. Postracialism would also compromise the intra-racial moral obligation and solidarity forged through racially stigmatised groups’ historical travails that is also necessary for their ongoing struggles (Stubblefield 2005). And at a more individual level, postracialism can be unsympathetic towards the existential dimensions of racialised life. The dispassionate eliminativist objective to strip racialised individuals of a significant aspect of their sense of being and the potential psychological dissonance that may result seems somewhat incompatible with the ethics of care central to the humanist sensibility favoured by cosmopolitan formations of postracialism.

These problems with the postracial are only indicative and by no means exhaustive; as such they also highlight the gravity of the postracial dilemma. Nevertheless, engaging the postracial problematic – Can race be eradicated? – is a fruitful exercise. The issue of the conceptual and practical status of race is seemingly intractable and confronting it elicits the customary rehearsals: race is real/unreal, an ideological construct, loose proxy and so on and so forth. But to think of racial eliminativism is a different project and invites alternative questions: Precisely what is to be eliminated? Why should race be eliminated? How can it be done? Even if these questions and related eliminativist queries are answered in a way unfavourable to the postracial project, the common sense of race and its status as a dominant episteme is being disturbed. And similarly, for racial eliminativism to reckon with its constituent problems is to think through the coherence of the project and its conditions of possibility.


‘It works in practice, but does it work in theory?’

Although its provenance is unclear, the question, ‘It works in practice, but does it work in theory?’, is particularly appropriate to the postracial problematic.​[4]​ Racial eliminativism, on one hand, offers a developing critical theoretical framework that attempts to cogently link epistemological, ontological, methodological, ethical and political concerns but its practicability is adjudged to be weak. Race, on the other hand, works well in practice, in the literal sense of functionality, but its theoretical coherence is admittedly poor. However, ‘It works in practice, but does it work in theory?’ can be considered more expansively: the question also suggests that we might not only require something to function but that we might also wish to understand how it functions. And there is also the issue of whether the functioning object in question works in an acceptable way and the extent to which its functionality might be altered or improved by an enhanced theoretical understanding.

Applying ‘It works in practice, but does it work in theory?’ to the postracial question is instructive. Race is undoubtedly practically effective. But the unacceptability of the invidious work it often performs might not be despite its inchoate theoretical premises but precisely because of it. The very spuriousness of the myths, legal doctrine, scientific claims, common sense and so on that have constituted the idea of race have facilitated its reproduction and transformation; the irrationality of race has enabled it to withstand the assault of reason. The theoretical weaknesses have enhanced its practical application and forestalled racial eliminativism by sponsoring the postracial dilemma: Guillaumin’s ‘Race does not exist. But it does kill people’ is an effective summary. The practical and political stakes of this dilemma are severe. On one hand, the cessation of collecting statistical data on racial discrimination (such as that intended by Proposition 54 in California) would effectively eradicate race by leading to a ‘no data, no problem’ conclusion while, on the other hand, the collection of such data is central to monitoring racial inequalities and informing the development of ameliorative strategies as a ‘no data, no justice’ formulation (Krieger 2010).

But to accede to the circularity of this racial reality is perhaps to submit also to the reproduction of its effects through being drawn into what Paul Gilroy refers to as ‘the pious ritual in which we always agree that ‘race’ is invented but then are required to defer to its embeddedness in the world and to accept that the demand for justice requires us nevertheless innocently to enter the political arenas it helps to mark out’ (2000: 52). Despite its practical shortcomings, then, an engagement with racial eliminativism might be worthwhile; to reflect on the postracial instead of race poses an altogether different set of questions of race and racial eliminativism that step outside of the circularity of racial realism: Do we want race? Why and what do we want it for? And are we prepared to endure its effects in order to have it? On the other hand: Why might we want to eliminate race? And what transformations could be possible without race?

In a sense racial eliminativism is a misnomer; essentially its pressing concern is not race but its effects, primarily racism – the data to which Nancy Krieger (2010) refers, for example, is not racial per se but the statistical capturing of racial inequality, discrimination, injustice; in short, racism not race.

That the postracial is deemed inimical to antiracism is presented within Barnor Hesse’s (2011) argument that by constituting the actually-existing postracial society as performative, liberal and governmental in contradistinction to the (Eurocentric) formulation of racism as representational, antiliberal and ideological, what he terms the postracial horizon is presented as a self-fulfilling prophecy – the emergent postracial order heralds the defeat of racism. Therefore, for Hesse, the critique of the postracial also requires engaging the problematic conceptualisation of racism, which invites a dramatic question: Is there a formulation of the postracial capable of assisting in the reconceptualisation of racism? Or, in other words, can there be an antiracist postracialism?

From a certain perspective this is precisely the objective of racial eliminativism. The reification of race through complex networks including administrative, legal, scientific, religious and cultural domains, has led to analyses implicating race within the causation of racism. Whether with regard to the race relations paradigm or theories of racial formation, the conceptual centrality of the race concept (even if qualified as ‘social’) continues to reify race ‘because they seek to construct their analytical concepts to reproduce directly the commonsense ideologies of the everyday world’ (Darder and Torres, 2004: 41, original emphasis). Drawing attention to processes of racialisation or the governmental and performative aspects of racism is to move away from employing race as a determining empirical object in the production of racism, even if only as an incidental but necessary component. While this is not advocating an eliminativist approach to race it tacitly admits its declining explanatory efficacy. ‘The problems of colored populations, of immigration and miscegenation, of anti-Semitism and national hatred’, wrote Barzun, ‘are not problems about a natural fact called race: they are problems of social life, of economic status, of educational policy, and political organization’ (1965: 201). Therefore, racial eliminativism might be viewed as a means to accurately portray and understand human social existence. Eliminating the category and concept of race will not end racism but may enable a better understanding of the discriminatory practices performed in the name of the idea of race without the diversionary and obfuscating effects of epiphenomenal racial categories. And if this eliminativist theory works well, it might have a productive and useful impact on antiracist practice.

So, the postracial is not actually-existing and yet it is many things: a process, an ambition, a dilemma, a mirage, an unfulfilled objective, a methodological scientific intervention, an ethical and political cosmopolitan calling, and a utopian enterprise that invites an imaginative and affirmative meditation on the desired future society and alternative way of life. Whether postracialism will ever be anything else, anything more ‘substantial’ is debatable. Howard Winant (2004: 165) argues that the world will ‘probably’ never ‘get beyond’ race and he may be right. But there is also the question of whether scholars and researchers of ‘race and ethnic relations’ would ideally like to get beyond race and its effects?
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^1	  Obama inauguration speech. Accessed at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/obama_inauguration/7840646.stm
^2	  In this chapter I extend the term racial eliminativism to refer to a critical practico-theoretical system oriented towards an eliminativist end that can also be characterised as postracial. Postracial and racial eliminativism are used interchangeably when the former is referred to as an idealisation and process with analytic value. This is also to distinguish postracial eliminativism from reference to the postracial as a gestural rhetorical stratagem synonymous with colour-blindness and/or an already-existing state.
^3	  Extending this reservation, Michael Banton’s chapter in this volume also addresses the efficacy of ethnicity within sociological analysis on the grounds that it is ‘a spurious word, a failed concept that should be discarded.’
^4	  The question is sometimes referred to as a joke or an apocryphal tale but, perhaps invoking the philosophes, often features a nonchalant Frenchman as the questioner in response to observing a new machine satisfactorily performing a mundane task.
